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lems facing communities in Latin America such as
Santo Domingo . High-school exchange programs , cultural contacts, Chamber-to-Chamber business relationships, and teacher exchanges were just a few of the
issues the two Sister City committees discussed in
Santo Domingo.
I
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have become a crucial component of hs~~~:~~~~}~(f~
operation and communication . This is e
recent years with the continued assault on official
ing for bilateral aid, non-governmental activities, and
educational exchanges.
Two examples from Bowling Green, Kentucky, illustrate the role that individuals and communities can play
in bringing the two realms closer together. Under the
auspices of the Sister City International program , Bowling Green is in partnership with Santo Domingo de los
Colorados in Ecuador. In October, 1994, an official delegation from Santo Domingo journeyed to Bowling
Green to participate in the city's annual international
festival and to interact with counterparts in the community. City government officials, the Chamber of Commerce, business people , WKU faculty, staff, and students, and members of the Bowling Green community
came together to host the delegation and to provide accommodations, meals, entertainment, and support.
In March, 1995, the Santo Domingo community reciprocated by hosting a Sister City delegation from BOWling Green . Three members of the Bowling Green Sister City committee traveled to Santo Domingo to help
develop a number of programs and to facilitate contacts
between Santo Domingo officials and other organizations. The delegation experienced first-hand the prob-
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tional, and business expertise with local communities in
Ecuador. In return, members of the community in cities
such as Santo Domingo share aspects of their language , culture, and society with their partners here in
Bowling Green In order to foster a broader and deeper
understanding of the two realms.
We all can do more to reach out to our partners in
progress in both realms. I encourage Intercambio readers to make an extra effort this year to get involved in
community groups that faci litate communication between the two cultures and to write at least one letter of
support to a colleague in the opposite realm. Our
friendship and mutual support network will be strengthened by your actions.
Until our Fall issue of Intercambio, hasta luego y un
fuerte abrazo.
David J. Keeling, Editor
Department o( Geography and Geology

The Nature of the Crisis
Although there is an immigration crisis that clearly is
tied tp an economic crisis, no obvious political crisis exists in Cuba to threaten Castro's power.
The Immigration Crisis: During the month of August,
1994, nearly 30,000 Cubans sought 10 escape Cuba by
making a ha1-ardous raft trip to Florida . This was the
largest exodus since the 1980 Mariel boat lift, which
brought 125,000 Cubans 10 Miami over three monlhs
during the twilight of Carter's presidency. However, the
sheer numbers did not make this situation a crisis.
Rather, the crisis arose from the lack of agreement on
how to control migration between Cuba and the U.S. in
an orderly , mutually acceptable manner. Immigration
crises occur whenever large number of Cubans are
forced to use illegal means to migrate because leg al
channels have become blocked by either the Cuban or
U.S. governments.
Historically, a clear pattern has existed in the immigration crises that periodically have punctuated U.S.Cuban relationships. Whenever there is a lack of a migration agreement between the two countries, or when
an existing agreement is effectively abrogated by one
or both sides, a crisis erupts and Castro gives the green
light to Cubans to leave as they wish. For exa mple , the
lack of a migration agreement from 1962-1965 after the
missile criSiS, and the consequent imposition of an embargo, around Cuba , resulted in pent-up migratory demand that Castro finally released in 1965. The Johnson
administration was forced to establish the policy of giving Cubans refugee status automatically. Then, from
1973 onwards, the U.S. began restricting the number of
Cubans it processed for visas , which effectively
(although not rorma lly) altered th e 1966 Johnson Administration policy . In tum , this created more pent-up
migratory demand leading in part to the 1980 Mariel crisis . President Carter accepted the immigrants into the
U.S. on humanitarian and ideological grounds. This
proved to be high ly unpopula r with the U.S. public, especially when it became clear that 45% of the man'elitos
had criminal records and therefore were excludable under U.S. im migration taw. Another' immigration agreement had to wait until 1984 , at wh ich time the Reagan
Administratio n decided to ailow up to 20.000 Cubans
each year into the U.S. and to accept political prisoners
and their families as refugees. But Cubans would no
longer be granted automatic immigrant status. Instead,
Cubans now would be treated the same as immigrants
from other countries. This agreement worked well untit
the late 1980s and early 1990s, when the number of
visa applicants to the U.S. began to skyrocket.
The latest crisis was due in part to the failure of th e
U.S. government to abide by its 1984 immigration
agreement with Cuba , in which it agreed to take up to
20,000 Cubans per year. Currently there is a backlog
of 19,000 visa applications in the U.S. Interests Section
(consulate) in Havana . For the past severa l years, the
U.S. government has allowed only about 5-6,000
Cubans to enter the country legally. As the economy

CUBA: DEMISE OF CASTRO?

Ken Johnson
Department of Government
Eastern Kentucky University
Cuba has endured a severe economic crisis since the
breakup of the Soviet Union in 1990-1991 . The severity
of the crisis, combined with the perceived lack of alternatives for overcoming it, have led many observers to
predict the impending fa ll of Fidel Castro, the lider maximo of Cuba for the past 35 years. Many consider the
most rece nt (August 1994) mass exodus of Cubans to
the U.S. as a sure sign of widespread discontent among
the Cuban people with Castro's regime. It is popularly
assumed that this discontent eventually will force Castro from power. Thus, the 32-year old U.S. policy of
isolating Cuba is geared to generating as much discontent on the island as possible in the hope of encouraging Castro's demise.
This interpretation of the latest immigration crisis and
its implications for Castro's survival is too simplistic and
amounts to wishful thinking among those who would like
to see Castro gone. My analysis is based on three observations. First, despite the severity of the crisis in
Cuba, its nature remains largely economic, not political.
Second, the nature of Castro's power makes his dem ise
unlikely. Castro has a proven track record in using adversity to enhance his power. Third , the U.S. policy of
isolating Cuba has failed , so far, to dislodge Castro or
even weaken his power, despite the manifold hardships
this power has wreaked on the Cuban people .
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with the former U.S.S.R . and Eastern bloc countries using hard currency at world ma rket prices in competition
with other co untries. The result has bee n disastrous for
the economy and people of Cuba. Over th e past four
years, Cuba 's national income has fallen 50% (-4% in
1990, -25% in 1991, and -15% in 1993). Imports from
form er COMECON countries are down by 90%. In
1992, oil imports were 1I1Oth of 1989 levels, fertilizer
im ports were 1/5th of 1989 levels, and anim al feed imports were 1/4 of 1989 levels. Meanwhile , the prices of
imported wheat, cRicken, and milk have risen between
16% and 40%, whil e prices for Cuba's two major exports have decreased preci pitously. Nickel exports are
down 20% and sugar prices are down by 28%. Bad
weather in 1993 destroyed 50% of Cuba's sugar harvest, giving it th e smallest crop of the ce ntury. As a
result , Cuba 's foreign exchange earnings declined by
approximately 73% between 1989 and 1992. In 1992,
Cuba cou ld afford only about 1/3rd the amount of imports purchased in 1989. There are chronic food and
medicine shortages, which lead to nutritional diseases
in a country that on ly a few years ago boasted the best
health statistics in Latin America. There are few cars
and buses in operation. Cubans of all ages now must
walk or ride one of the millions of Chinese-built bicycles
that have been imported because gasol ine is beyond
the reach of the Cu ban treasu ry . Oxen ratherthan tractors now plow the fields, giving Cuba a surrea list feel of
having fallen ba ck in time a century or more.
Alth oug h, stri ctly speaking, the U.S. embargo didn 't
"cau se- the current crisis in Cuba, it certain ly is contributing to Cu ba's economic problem s by mak.ing recovery extremely difficult. The 32-year old U.S. embarg o of Cuba is the most stringent ever appl ied by the
U.S. to any country. 11 seeks to prohi bit: (a) U. S. firms
and subsidiaries from trading with Cu ba ; (b) the importati on from any cou ntry of any prod uct that co ntains
even trace amounts of Cuban inputs; (c) firms operating outside the U.S. from selling Cuba n produ cts with
more than a 20% U.S. content; (d) foreign banks in the
U.S. from keeping dolla r accounts for Cuba or conducting transactions with Cuba in dollars: and (e) ships
from docking in the U.S. for 3 mont hs after those ships
have docked in a Cuban port. In add ition to these legal
proh ibitions , the U. S. gove mment has used diplomatiC
and pol it ical pressure to prevent fo reign fi rms and governments fro m trading with Cuba. The embargo's impact on the Cuban economy from 1962 to 1990 is estimated at S38 billion in lost national income. Moreover,
the embargo is a continuous source of friction between
the U.S. and othe r cou ntries. Virtually all Latin American countries , Ca nada, the Europea n Union , and the
U.N. ha ve ca ll ed on the U.S. to end its embargo of
Cuba , citing violations of international standards of human rights as well as of international laws.
Th e good news is that the worst of th e eco nomic crisis in Cuba probabl y is over. The bad news is that improvem ents over the short- or medi um-term are un likel y without a sig nificant shift away from the comma nd econom y and without an easing of the U.S.' embargo . The key to Cu ba's economic recovery is to gen-

and living cond itions in Cuba have pl ummeted during
the last four years, the number of Cubans applying for
U.S. visas has skyrocketed. Given this growing backlog
of visa applications, desperate Cubans began pinning
their hopes instead on the trade winds of the Flori da
Straits.
In the face of a tightening U.S. embargo against Cuba
(The Cuba Democracy Act or Torricelli Law of 1992),
and the U.S. refusal to process the number of visa applicants stated in the 1984 agreement , Castro once
again gave the green light, in July 1994, to any Cuban
wanting to leave the island. And once again this act
forced the U.S. (this time, the Clinton Administrati on) to
negotiate a migration agreement with Cuba . Th e
September 9th agreement signed in New York ba sically
reiterated the 1984 Reagan policy: the U.S. agreed to
(1) admit up to 20 ,000 Cubans per year, (2) grant immediate refugee status to the several thousand appli cants
who were close relatives of exiles in the U.S., and (3) to
treat Cuban immigrants the same as immigrants from
other countries. For his part , Castro agreed to stop encourag ing illegal emigration from Cuba.
The immigration crises have benefitted Castro in a
number of ways. First , they have forced the U.S. to the
negotiating table at Ca stro 's initiative . Seco nd , each
crisis has given Castro an opportunity to denounce the
embargo and to shift blame for Cuba 's problems to the
U.S. policy of isolation. Third, they have permitted Castro to get rid of dissidents and undesirables , thus
strengthening his hold on power.
The periodic immigration crises, of course , are symptomatic of dissatisfaction with the political , economic,
and social conditions on the island. The most frequently cited reasons for lea ving Cuba include the desire to be reunited with exiled family members and the
hope for a better quality of life than currently is available on the island.
The Economic Crisis. The economic crisis has three
aspects: (1) the breakdown of concessionary trad e relationships with the U.S.S.R. and the Eastern bloc in
1990; (2) the continuing emba rgo of the U.S.; and (3)
the poor prospects for a viable economic future given
aspects (1) and (2) .
Prior to 1990, Cuba had a con cessionary trade relationship with the Soviets . During the 1980s, Soviet assistance to Cuba averaged between $225-430 per
capita, or 15-30% of Cuba 's national income. The Soviets purchased Cuban sugar and nickel well above world
prices, while it sold oil to Cuba at below world prices.
Cuba then would sell some of the surplus oil it produ ced
or refined at home on the world market to earn hard
currency . This very favo rable arrangement created a
high degree of trade dependen ce between Cuba and
COMECON (the Soviet economic bloc). In 1988, 85%
of Cuba's imports came from COMECON , wh ile 81 % of
Cuba's exports went to COMECON .
With the fall of communism beginning in the late
19805, and the transition to market economies during
the early 1990s, Cuba's special trade relationship with
COMECON has come to an end . Cuba now must trade
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gion . The key to this policy has been the maintenance
of a full economic embargo. Arguments in favor of the
embargo argue that an embargo is necessary to : (1)
punish Castro for expropriating U.S. companies and embracing the Soviet Union as an ally; (2) prevent Castro
from consolidating his revolution ; (3) encourage Castro
to initiate political reform; and (4) send a message to
other countries that- the U.S. will not tolerate communism in "its· neighborhood. Although the embargo has
failed to achieve any of these goals over the course of
30 years, many continue to insist on its maintenance . It
is argued that as Cuba no longer can count on extemal
support, the embargo finally has a chance to succeed in
toppling Castro.
There are several arguments against the embargo,
and these now are being voiced louder and more frequently by "mainstream" policymakers. First, the embargo punishes the Cuban people, not Castro and his
government; therefore it is immoral. Second, the embargo continues to give Castro the enemy he needs (los
yanquis) to consolidate and to keep power. Third, the
embargo has not encouraged political reform in Cuba.
Finally, now that the Cold War is over, there is no reason to keep the embargo, since Castro and Cuba pose
no strategic threat to the U.S.
Probably the most realistic policy option for the U.S. is
to start using the embargo as a more effective bargaining chip by pursuing an incremental policy of constructive engagement . Such a policy would recognize that
contemporary U.S. interests in Cuba are changing. The
U.S. no longer has to worry about limiting Soviet influence in the Western hemisphere. nor does it need to
worry about Castro exporting revolution . Instead, the
U.S. should worry about stability in Cuba and should encourage democratic capitalist reform . Rather than waiting for Castro to make the first move and being forced
merely to react to circumstances of his making (as the
U.S. historically has done), the U.S. should take the initiative and stop playing the political game that Castro
knows how to play so well.
A policy of constructive engagement with Cuba would
serve U.S. interests in a number of ways. First, it would
rob Castro of his enemy and of his favored means of
keeping power. Second , it would expose the Cuban
masses and elites to development alternatives via the
freer exchange of people, ideas, and goods. Third, it
would give the Cuban people hope, a prerequisite to demanding radical change. Fourth , it would allow the U.S.
to exert more influence over a likely transition in Cuba.
Finally, constructive engagement would put the U.S.
more in line with hemispheric and world opinion. No
other country in the hemisphere supports the continuation of the embargo, and both the European Union and
the United Nations have called for the U.S. to reevaluate its Cuba policy. The moral credibility of the U.S. as
a world leader is being damaged by a continued refusal
to deal constructively with Castro.

erate foreign exchange earnings, attract investment,
and develop links with the U.S., its natural trading partner. Although foreign investment has increased by $500
million over 1992-1993, it does not compensate Cuba
for the billions lost in Soviet concessions. Moreover,
most foreign investment has been limited to the tourist
sector, the growth of which creates social problems that
Castro's revolution has been committed to eradicate
(income inequalities, prostitution , drug use and trafficking, illegal gambling, etc.). Since 1992, Castro has permitted Cubans to hold U.S. dollars, in the hope of gaining increased dollar remittances from Cubans living in
the U.S. This worked (albeit with negative social consequences) until 1993, when the Clinton Administration
banned dollar remittances to Cuba .
The Nature of Castro's Power
Given the severity of the economic criSis, the dramatic
decline in living standards, and the lack of alternatives
under the present socioeconomic structure in Cuba, an
important question arises: Why doesn't Cuban society
blame Castro and demand a change? The answer has
to do with the nature of Castro's hold on power and on
the Cuban people. First, a hostile U.S. policy of isolation continues to propagate a fear of the U.S. among
Cubans, a fear that Castro uses to his political advantage. It becomes easier for Castro to blame the U.S. for
Cuba's problems. Second, Cuba is a totalitarian state :
secret police, neighborhood committees, and the pervasive communist party root out dissidents, create a climate of mistrust, and effectively hinder any efforts at
organizing an alternative to Castro either at the grassroots level (churches, universities, unions, etc.) or
Third , Castro's
among elites within the regime .
charisma should not be discounted ; he is a master at
being "one of the people: Castro loves to go out among
the people to listen to their problems, hear their criticisms, and take personal responsibility for trying to
solve them. This personal connection with the people
continues to endear him to the masses, quite unlike the
communist leaders of Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union who became aloof and distant during times of
crises . Fourth , Cubans are too busy standing in lines,
walking or riding long distances, or working in emergency brigades (on behalf of the state) to have time to
organize any opposition. Finally, there exists a pervasive sense of fatalistic resignation in Cuba. Most
Cubans see few viable alternatives to Castro. Many are
convinced that if Castro goes, then the U.S . and the
Cuban-American exile community will return to Cuba ,
forcing most of the beneficiaries of the Cuban revolution
to become losers. Although life with Fidel is hard , it is
a hardship more or less equally distributed among all
Cubans.
U.S. Policy Options
Since Eisenhower, U.S. policy has been to isolate
Castro and Cuba economically and politically in the
hope of containing the spread of communism in the re-
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brary . The lectures are designed to inform members of
the community about Latin American issues in a relaxed , non-academic environment. In January , Dr.
David J. Keeling presented a slide show and talk titled
"In Search of the Inca: Travels in Peru ." Dr. Keeling's
presentation contrasted the urban world of Lima , Peru's
national capital, with the ind igenous world of the Andes
highlands. Slides of Lima , Machu Pichu, CuzCQ, and
Lake Titicaca provided audience members with visual
images of this fascinating area in South America.
In February, OJ. Richard Pace spoke on ·Spirits,
Possession, and Mediums in Brazil ." Drawing on research and personal experiences from trips to Brazil ,
Dr. Pace explained the differences between spiritualism and candomble , among other local and regional
religions, to a large and enthusiastj~ audience . At the
end of March, Dr. Juan Pena explained the origins of
the Spanish spoken in Latin America . He.traced the
diffusion of the language from the various regions of
Spain to the New World in the 15th and 16th centuries
and suggested that the Andalusian region in southern
Spain influenced New World Spanish more than any
other region in Spain .
The year ended on a high note with a presentation in
April by Dr. Margaret Curt is-Howe titled "EcuadorGreen Horizons ." Margaret talked about her recent
visit to Ecuador as part of a Sister City delegation and
gave an enthralling account of her experiences in this
Andean country. Slides of Santo Domingo de los Colorados, the beach at Atacames, and the indigenous
markets in Otavalo demonstrated the varied cultures
and landscapes that make Latin America so exciting.
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CONFERENCE ANNOUNCEMENT
The 1995 conference of the Midwest Association of
Latin American Studies will be held in Banos, Ecuador,
November 18-2 1, 1995. Full details of the conference,
as well as a Call for Papers and conference registration
materials, are available in the February MALAS newsletter. For more information , contact Dr. Mark Lowry,
Program Coordinator, at (502) 745-5979 , Fax: (502)
745-6410, Email : mark.lowry@wku .edu , or write to the
Latin American Stud ies Center at Western Kentucky
University.

LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES
SPRING CONFERENCE
The annual Latin American Studies Spring Conference was held at Western Kentucky University on April
20 and 21 , 1995. Dr. James Wiley from the Department of Economics and Geography at Hofstra University in New York presented a fa scinating account of
Central American refugees and the issue o f human
rights. His talk entitled "Returnees and the Internally
Displaced : Human Rights and Development in
Guatemala" draw a large and enthusiastic audience.
On Friday evening , Dr. Wiley joined Lat in American
Studies faculty , staff, and students at a potluck dinner
hosted by Dr. Keeling . The sounds of va rious dialects
of Spanish filled the air as students and faculty alike
listened to Latin music and discussed their various experiences in Latin America .

LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES
PUBLIC LECTURE SERIES
During the Spring semester, the Latin American
Studies Committee continued its recently established
Public Lecture Series al the Bowling Green Public Li
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Ms. Donna Cheshire , Assistant Director of
Intern ational Programs, and Or. John Petersen ,
Director of International Programs, traveled 10 Belize
in February to represent Western Kentucky University
at the annual conference of the Consortium of Belize
Educational Cooperation (COBEC) .

LATIN AMERICA STUDIES SCHOLARSHIP
Mauricio Sanchez from Venezuela received the 1995
latin American Student Scholarship Award. Mauricio
has been active in both drama and dance presentations
on campus . A $200 book award was presented to
Mauricio by Dr. David J . Keeling at the University Student Awards Ceremony on April 9. The award is given
in recognition of the stud ent's excellence In scholarship,
community service, and contribution to international understanding.

Or. David J. Keeling , D.epartmenl of Geography
and Geology , visited Ecuador during March 1995 . He
led a group representing the Bowling Green Sister City
Committee and the International Committee of the
Chamber of Commerce to Santo Domingo de los
Colorados. While in Santo Domi ngo, Or. Keel ing
helped to establish a Habitat for Humanity committee
and also presented med ical supplies donated from the
Bowling Green health community to Santo Domingo's
new clinic. Dr. Keeli ng also spend two wonderful days
in Ecuador's capital city, Quito, cond ucting preliminary
research for a paper to be presented in November at
the MALAS annual conference in Banos, Ecuador.
After over two years of resea rch, writing , and
editing , Or. Keeling finally finished a book on urban
restructuring in Buenos Aires, Argentina . Part of the
·Wor1d Cities· series published by John Wiley & Sons,
the book examines the impact of globalizing the urban
economy on Buenos Aires' SOCiety and environment.
T he book is due out later in the year. Dr. Keeling
hopes to return to Argentina later this year to continue
research on the im pact of economic restructuring on
the various regions of the country.

WKU FACULTY ACTIVITIES
Dr. Mark Lowry 11, Department of Geography and
Geology , spent Fall 1994 on sabbatica l in Ecuador conducti ng research on severallopics including the impact
of rapid development on the ind igenous peoples of
Santo Domingo de los Colorados. Dr. l owry also orga-

nized th e in-country components of the 1995 MALAS
conference, to be held in Banos, November 18-21.

Or. Margaret Curtis-Howe , Department of Philosophy and Religion, traveled to Santo Domingo de los
Colorados, Ecuador, in March as a member of the
Bowling Green Sister City delegation . Margaret coordinated an exchange of written and visual materials between various high-school students in both cities, as
well as representing the Rotary Club of Bowling Green .
Dr. Curtis-Howe presented her experiences in Ecuador
at a Latin American Studies public lecture in April and
at a Rotary Clu b lunch in May .

Dr. Richard Pace , Depa rtment of Sociology and
Anthropology,
spent January in Mexi co at the
Un iversidad Aut6noma Chapingo as a participant in
WKU's trilateral affil iation program with Chapingo and
Trent University in Canada .

Center for Latin American Studies
Office of International Programs
Western Kentucky University
1 Big Red Way
Bowling Green, Kentucky 42101
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